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Abstract 
Japan has experienced a deep and prolonged banking crisis in the 1990s. In this paper we 
attempt to identify the characteristics of companies which have the most to lose from the 
banks’ malaise. Using stock price data, we calculate abnormal returns of non-financial 
companies around significant dates in the history of the banking crisis, starting in 1995. 
The events we study include various government actions to address the crisis, 
downgrading of banks by international rating agencies, and bank mergers. We find that 
not all companies are equally sensitive to events in the banking sector. The most affected 
are small companies, with low profits, in low-tech sectors, with high leverage and limited 
access to bond markets. These findings are consistent with macroeconomic “credit 
crunch” theories according to which small companies with limited reputation are the most 
affected when banks reduce lending. Our results are also in line with theories suggesting 
that bank debt is not very important for financing innovation. 
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I. Introduction 
  Japan has experienced a deep and prolonged banking crisis. Estimates of the 
magnitude of the crisis vary (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001), but it is evident that the problem 
of non-performing loans is severe, and that the ability of banks to provide capital to 
corporate clients is substantially impaired. In this paper we argue that the macroeconomic 
crisis in Japan, and the banks’ restricted lending ability, have not affected everybody 
equally. Some sectors, and some companies, continue to do quite well. At the same time, 
relatively small companies, with limited access to bond markets and a heavy debt burden, 
suffer more. We also observe that companies in industries where R&D intensity is 
relatively high are not very sensitive to the troubles of the banking sector. Our results are 
therefore consistent with a large macroeconomic literature that identified small 
companies as being especially sensitive to restrictive monetary policy. Our results are 
also consistent with the financial economics literature according to which R&D intensive 
industries are not very dependent on bank finance. An optimistic conclusion that can be 
drawn from this analysis is therefore that the Japanese banking crisis may lead to some 
“creative destruction” of weak companies in low-tech sectors, a process which is not 
necessarily detrimental to the Japanese economy.     
  Casual observation of stock price indexes for different industries in Japan 
suggests that not all sectors have suffered equally (Figure 1). Some industries, such as 
transportation equipment, electronics, or precision instruments, have fared much better 
than others (e.g. real estate, construction and textiles). This indicates that industries, and 
perhaps firms, of different characteristics, exhibit different degrees of sensitivity to a 
crisis-driven credit crunch. To investigate these issues, we assemble data on stock price   2
responses of non-financial firms to events related to the banking sector. The events we 
study include various government actions in relation to the banking sector, downgrading 
of banks by the two major international rating agencies (Moody’s and S&P), and bank 
mergers (Japan has experienced a consolidation wave in recent years). All these events 
may affect the ability of banks to offer credit. Around each event, we estimate cumulative 
ten-day abnormal returns for a sample of roughly 800 listed non-financial companies. We 
then relate the abnormal returns to firm characteristics such as size, “quality” (Tobin’s q), 
leverage, R&D intensity, bond rating, and measures of the strength of bank-firm ties. 
This enables us to characterize companies that are most sensitive to the malaise of the 
banking sector. 
  The present paper is naturally related to the large literature on bank-firm 
relationships. More specifically, it is closely tied to the financial economics literature that 
investigates the stock price response of companies to the distress of banks with which 
they maintain a relationship, using event study methodology. Notable among these 
studies are Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1993, US data), Bae, Kang and Lim (2002, 
Korean data), Djankov, Jindra, and Klapper (2001, data from several Asian countries), 
and Ongena, Smith, and Michalsen (2002, Norwegian data). Two studies apply this 
methodology to bank failures in Japan. Yamori and Murakami (1999) study the stock 
price response of clients of the failed Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. Brewer et al. (2002), 
which is closest to the present study, examine, in addition to the failure of Hokkaido 
Takushoku, the responses of client firms to the failures of the LTCM and NCB. The main 
result that emerges from the literature on bank distress and client firms’ stock returns is 
that (with the exception of Norway), there is usually a negative stock price response of   3
client firms to bank troubles, which is interpreted as evidence of the importance of bank-
firm relationships. With the exception of Brewer et al. (2002), none of these studies 
attempts to distinguish between the stock price responses of different types of firms. The 
present paper therefore contributes to this literature in two ways. First, like Brewer et al. 
(2002), we focus on the differential response of firms with different characteristics. 
Among the firm characteristics that we examine, R&D intensity and bond rating have not 
been studied before. Second, the present paper differs from the existing studies of this 
type in the scope of the events we study. Unlike previous studies, we do not focus on 
bank failures, but rather include a large number and variety of positive and negative 
events related to the banking crisis and to the ability of banks to offer new loans.  
  The paper is also related to another line of research in financial economics, 
according to which different types of finance are appropriate for different types of 
economic activities. One conclusion that emerges from this literature, which is supported 
by our findings that firms in R&D intensive sectors are not very sensitive to bank-related 
events, is that R&D activity rarely relies on bank finance (Allen and Gale, 2000, Carlin 
and Mayer, 2002). 
  The macroeconomic literature on (monetary policy and) “credit crunch” is also 
related to our work. For our purposes, the main relevant conclusion from this literature is 
that small firms, as well as firms with limited access to financial markets, are more 
sensitive to changes in available bank credit (because of shifts in monetary policy) than 
are bigger and more reputable firms. (See, for example, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994, or 
Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox, 1993). The present paper can therefore be viewed as an   4
attempt to connect the financial economics and macro schools of thought, and offer some 
conclusions on the type of firms, which are most sensitive to banking crises. 
  Finally, the paper is, of course, also related to studies of the Japanese banking 
crisis and its impact on firm behavior. Gibson (1995 and 1997) estimates the sensitivity 
of corporate investment in Japan to banking troubles, reaching ambiguous conclusions. 
Kang and Stulz (2000) argue that firms with strong bank ties were hardest hit by the crisis 
of the (early) 1990s. Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002) show that FDI activity of 
Japanese firms in the US was affected by the health of the investing firms’ banks.  
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next offers a brief chronology 
of the Japanese banking crisis since the mid-1990s. Section III describes our data set, 
which consists of stock price data, financial reports, measures of bank-firm relationships, 
and newspaper clips. The event study technique we use is also discussed in this section. 
The results are presented in Section IV, and Section V concludes.  
 
II. A Brief Chronology of the Japanese Banking Crisis, 1995-2000
1 
In this section we briefly outline some of the major developments in the Japanese 
banking sector in the second half of the 1990s. The period can be divided into three sub-
periods: 
 
Phase I (Mid 1995 - Fall 1997): The Emergence of Banking Troubles 
The problems of the banking sector first became apparent in mid-1995, when two 
large credit unions and a regional bank failed as a result of bad loans. These failures were 
                                                            
1 This section is based, in part, on Peek and Rosengren (2001), Ito and Harada (2000), Nakaso (2001), as 
well as on unpublished data collected by Jenny Corbett, the on-line archives of the New York Times and 
several other journals.   5
followed by the Daiwa scandal in the fall of that year. This period witnessed also the 
Jusen crisis, when housing loan companies ran into severe difficulties as a result of the 
decline in land prices. The resolution of the crisis was costly and involved the use of both 
public private funds. Out of losses of 6410 billion yen, 55 percent (3500 billion yen) were 
born by the Jusen founding banks, 27 percent (1700 billion yen) by lending banks, 8 
percent (530 billion yen) by agricultural financial institutions, and only the remaining 10 
percent (680 billion yen) were covered by the government. 
As a result of these developments, the “Japan Premium” on the cost of debt of 
Japanese banks first appeared in Euro markets. Bank stock prices declined relative to 
other stocks starting around the end of 1995 (see Figure 1), and rating agencies began to 
downgrade Japanese banks. The credit ratings of major banks were AA or higher in the 
early 1990s; following the Jusen crisis and some bank bailouts, many banks were 
downgraded. For example, the Long Term Credit Bank of Japan (LTCB), Nippon Credit 
Bank (NCB), Hokkaido Takushoku Bank (HTB) and Daiwa were downgraded from A all 
the way to BBB (see Appendix A).  
At the end of fiscal year 1995, “loans under risk management,” published by each 
bank, amounted to 21.9 trillion yen, almost twice the amount a year earlier.
2 This 
triggered some government attempts to strengthen the supervision of the banking sector, 
which, at the time, was the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance.  
 
 
Phase II (End of 1997 – March 1999): Financial Crisis 
                                                            
2  These include loans to failed firms, loans on which payments have been suspended, and loans with 
“relaxed conditions,” see Hoshi and Kashyap (2001).   6
Macroeconomic conditions started to deteriorate in April 1997, when 
consumption taxes were raised. The first bank failure and the onset of the financial crisis 
occurred in November 1997. On November 3, Sanyo Securities defaulted in the inter-
bank loan market, delivering a serious shock to the market. This was followed by the 
collapse of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank in mid-November, and Yamaichi Securities, one 
of the four large securities houses, at the end of that month. This resulted in an increase in 
the Japan Premium and a further decline in bank stock prices. International rating 
agencies continued to downgrade the Japanese banks, and the credit rating of some major 
banks became as low as BBB, or even BB. 
In view of the impending financial crisis, the Japanese government sought to 
ameliorate the under-capitalization of the banks by injecting capital to the banking sector 
took in March 1998. The newly created Financial Crisis Management Committee handled 
this capital injection, which had a calming effect on financial markets until May. 
However, financial markets were apparently not convinced that the banking problems had 
been definitely dealt with. The LTCB crisis, the largest bank failure in Japan’s postwar 
history further threatened financial stability.  
 In order to cope with the crisis, the government attempted, starting in mid-1998, 
to pass several reform bills. One of these bills was the Financial Revitalization Act, 
which was designed to deal with failed financial institutions. Under this law, a failed 
bank could either be placed under Financial Reorganization Administration (FRA), or 
could be temporarily nationalized. This law formed the basis for the government’s 
decision in late 1998 to nationalize LTCB and NCB, both on the verge of bankruptcy.     7
Another bill passed during this period was the Financial Function Early 
Strengthening Law (Soki Koznka-Ho, English term from Nakaso, 2001). This bill 
replaced an earlier legislation of February 1998, under which capital injection into viable 
banks using public money could take place. The Financial Reconstruction Commission 
was established in order to operate the entire safety net under the new laws, ranging from 
dealing with bank failures to capital injections. Within this new framework, available 
funding was doubled and, using a larger volume of public funds, the government hoped 
to convey a clear commitment to cope with the non-performing loan problem.   
In addition, government supervision of the banking sector seems to have 
improved during this period. The establishment of the Financial Supervision Agency 
(FSA, Kinyu Kantoku-cho) in June 1998 shifted the responsibility of financial supervision 
from the Ministry of Finance to an independent entity.  
 
Phase III (April 1999 - End of 2001): The Merger Wave 
No outright financial collapse occurred in Japan during this period, despite the 
prolonged crisis. The Japan Premium declined starting in spring 1999, in part because of 
the government’s capital injections and other measures designed to improve bank health, 
and in part because of a certain improvement in the performance of the Japanese 
economy in the fourth quarter of 1999. 
The most striking characteristic of this phase was the big consolidation wave 
among major banks, with merger announcements starting in the summer 1999. The first 
large merger plan was the announcement of the formation of the Mizuho group, which 
was followed by other large major banks. This merger movement included not only city   8
banks, but also trust banks and securities companies within newly established financial 
groups (see Appendix B).  
An important catalyst for the rapid transformation of the Japanese banking 
industry was the “Big Bang” plan, aiming to thoroughly deregulate Japan’s financial 
system. This plan, which was announced in November 1996, constituted the last step in 
the deregulation process, which originated in the late 1970s. An important feature of the 
Big Bang was the removal of restrictions that separated banking, securities business, and 
insurance operations. As a result, Japanese banks began to seek partners in order to 
survive in a fiercely competitive domestic and international financial environment.  
Another driving force behind the merger wave was the public funds injected to 
large banks and the restructuring plan submitted to the government in Phase II. Injected 
public funds often took the form of preferred stocks, so that the government could 
exercise stronger control of bank management if a bank failed to fulfill the restructuring 
plan, or could not pay dividends on these preferred stocks. Consequently, banks 
attempted to increase profitability by merging with other banks and by restructuring their 
operations and organization. For example, Mizuho Holdings planned to reduce costs by 
closing 170 domestic and 60 overseas branches. By April 2001, as a result of this merger 
wave, the 13 “city banks” which existed in early 1993 had been reduced to five. 
Nevertheless, by the end of 2000, economic conditions deteriorated again, the 
volume of non-performing loans remained high, and the allowance for loan losses 
seemed insufficient (Table 1). The government apparently lost some of the zeal to deal 
with non-performing loans, and the continuous asset price deflation made things even 
worse. Investors’ concerns about the problems of the banking sector caused a continuous   9
increase in the performance difference between bank stocks and the rest of the Nikkei 
Index in early 2001. In response, the government resumed its efforts to strengthen 
banking supervision.     
  
III. Data and Empirical Approach 
Sample and Data Sources  
  Our sample includes about 800 listed firms on the First Section of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. These firms are mostly in manufacturing industries and, in addition, in 
construction, real estate, and retail (which are sectors that are likely to be sensitive to the 
availability of bank finance). The information we gather on each firm consists of several 
parts. First, we use daily stock price data drawn from the Kabuka Soran (Toyo Keizai). 
We use financial statements and information on Tobin’s q from the Waseda-Nissei 
Corporate Governance Database. For each event we collect information from financial 
statements for the corresponding period.  
   We identify each firm’s main bank (if there is one) according to several different 
definitions. The first defines a company’s main bank as the top lending bank in the Japan 
Company Handbook (as in Gibson, 1995). This definition identifies about three-quarters 
of all firms as having a main bank. The second definition is slightly more stringent, 
stipulating that only if the top lending bank is the largest lender over a five-year period 
will it be defined as a main bank (slightly less than two-thirds of all firms have a main 
bank according to these criteria). The third definition requires, in addition to the first two 
definitions, that the ratio of main bank loans to firm assets exceed the median (or mean) 
value of this variable in the sample (3.6 percent or 5.1 percent, respectively). Using mean   10
bank loans, about one third of the companies in the sample are classified as main bank 
clients according to this definition. Other main bank definitions we examine require 
instead of, or in addition to the above requirements, that shareholding by the main bank 
exceed the median value of this variable in the sample. In practice, the results of the 
empirical analysis are not sensitive to the definition of the main bank. The coefficients in 
the tables below refer to the first, and broadest, definition.    
R&D intensive industries are identified according to ratio of R&D expenditures to 
sales, and include chemicals, pharmaceuticals, machinery, electronics, transportation 
equipment, and precision instruments. Roughly half of the sample firms are in R&D-
intensive industries.   
Our measure of credit rating is based on the most conservative credit rating by 
any of the major rating agencies (i.e. the lowest available credit rating is used). In our 
data, a company’s bond rating is coded on a scale from one to four, where one 
corresponds to a rating of A or higher, two to a rating between BBB and A-, three to a 
rating of BBB-, and four to complete absence of rating (not investment grade). (Thus, a 
low credit rating corresponds to a high code in the data). The variable definitions and 
basic statistics are summarized in Table 2. 
  
Empirical Approach 
Our empirical analysis is based on measurement of abnormal stock returns for our 
sample of firms around the date of an event related to the banking crisis. As in all event 
studies, we begin by estimating the “market model.” For each firm, stock returns are 
regressed on (a constant and) the market returns (Tokyo Stock Exchange Price Index, the   11
TOPIX index), using 40 daily observations between dates –60 and –20 (where date zero 
is the date of the event in question). The estimated parameters of the regression are then 
used to generate the predicted return for each firm around the event date. Finally, 
abnormal returns are defined as the actual stock returns in excess of the model’s 
prediction. Because it is sometimes hard to verify the date on which news might have 
affected the market, and because some events evolved over several trading days, the 
analysis that follows will focus on cumulative abnormal returns between dates –5 and +5 
for each event.  
 
IV. Hypotheses, Results and Discussion 
  We report our findings for three classes of events. The first class of events we 
examine consists of various government actions designed to address the banking crisis. It 
is interesting to examine which government actions were interpreted as likely to improve 
the ability of banks to offer new loans, and therefore associated with a positive response 
in the stock prices of client firms.  
  The second class consists of cases of downgrading of banks by one of the two 
major international rating agencies, Moody’s and S&P. This class of events is 
unambiguously bad for banks (resulting in an increased cost of raising funds), and 
consequently, we assume, for bank clients as well. 
  Finally, the third class of events consists of three major bank mergers. These 
events are of particular interest, both because of the large wave of consolidation in the 
Japanese financial system, and because the effect of bank mergers on client firms is a 
priori ambiguous. On the one hand, a merger may contribute to bank health and may   12
therefore improve a bank’s ability to offer new loans. If this effect is important, the stock 
price response of client firms will tend to be positive. On the other hand, a merger may 
endanger the relationship between a firm and its main bank, for example because of a 
merger could take place between a firm’s main bank and the main bank of one of its rival 
(see some discussion of this point in Yafeh, 2002). Bank mergers could also lead to a 
negative effect on the stock prices of client companies simply because the combined bank 
may be forced to sell some of its equity stakes in order not to exceed the legal maximum 
of 5 percent. 
 
IV.1 Government Actions 
  We divide the eleven events in this category into three groups. The first, and 
chronologically the earliest, consists of measures to resolve the Jusen problem. In the 
second category we investigate government injections of capital to the banking sector. 
Several government steps to improve banking supervision are discussed in the third group.  
 
The Jusen Problem  
(i) The government announces steps to resolve the Jusen problem on March 19, 1995. 
(ii) The Diet (parliament) passes bills on Jusen liquidation on June 18, 1996. 
 
 
Injection of Funds 
(iii) Banks request a government injection of funds on March 5, 1998.   13
(iv) The Upper House passes bills to inject funds to the banking industry on October 12, 
1998. 
(v) Banks apply for government funds again on March 5, 1999. 
(vi) The government approves the banks’ request for funds on March 12 1999. 
 
Measures to Improve Banking Supervision and Reform the Banking Sector  
(vii) The government adopts bill to establish the independent Financial Supervisory 
Agency on March 11, 1997.  
(viii) The Financial Advisory Agency is established on June 22, 1998. 
(ix) The Financial Examination Manual is made public on April 8, 1999. 
(x) Emergency package for the banking sector is unveiled on April 6, 2001. 
(xi) Plan and timetable for the reform of the banking sector are published on September 
21, 2001. 
As noted above, it is not always easy to identify precisely the time at which 
information on government actions reaches the market. Therefore, rather than focus on 
abnormal returns on the announcement date, date 0, we present in Table 3 regression 
results where the dependent variable is CAR, cumulative abnormal returns, between 
dates –5 and 5. The results appear to vary considerably across the three event groups. 
Government actions related to the resolution of the Jusen problem seem to have 
produced little impact on stock returns, although we do find some evidence that these 
actions had a more positive effect on the stock prices of companies in low-R&D sectors.  
By contrast, government injections of capital to the banking sector seem to have 
been far more important. In particular, these measures constituted “good news” for the   14
typical bank dependent company: operating in a low-tech sector, with limited access to 
bond markets and a high degree leverage, the coefficient on which is large and highly 
statistically significant. The importance of this category of events probably stems also 
from their timing in Phases II and III, in which leveraged firms faced an acute liquidity 
shortage. It is also interesting to note that when measures of main bank ties are added to 
the regression (main bank loans and shareholding) we find that firms with high ratios of 
main bank debt to total assets benefited from capital injection measures more than other 
firms.
3  
Similarly, the main beneficiaries of improving banking supervision, presumably 
interpreted as steps to remedy the system, were also small firms, with low q, in low-tech 
sectors, with limited access to bond finance (low bond rating) and a high degree of 
leverage.
4 We conclude that (a) (at least some) government actions matter; and (b) that 
firms which can be characterized as bank-dependent respond more to such government 
actions. 
 
                                                            
3 The other coefficients remain qualitatively unchanged, although the statistical significance on leverage 
falls probably because of collinearity. The results are shown in Appendix C. The capital injection 
regression results are also unchanged when the last event in this category (dated March 12, 1999) is 
excluded from the regression because of its proximity to the previous event (dated March 5, 1999). 
4 It is interesting to note that the first event in this category (in May 1997) seems to have been the least 
important, perhaps because it was hard to evaluate the government’s approach to banking supervision at 
that relatively early stage.    15
IV.2. Downgrading of Banks’ Credit Rating 
We now turn to several events in which major Japanese banks were downgraded 
by international rating agencies. This section of the paper examines some of the most 
dramatic downgrading announcements:   
(a)  The announcement of downgrading of Mitsubishi, Sakura, Sumitomo and DKB 
banks by S&P on December 22, 1995. 
(b)  The announcement of downgrading of Sakura, LTCB and Daiwa banks by 
Moody’s on January 22, 1996.  
(c)  The announcement of downgrading of Sakura and Sanwa banks by S&P on 
December 29, 1997. 
(d)  The announcement of downgrading of LTCB, Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Asahi and 
Daiwa banks by S&P on March 30, 1998. 
(e)  The announcement of downgrading of Daiwa, Sumitomo, DKB, IBJ, Sakura, 
Sanwa, and Tokai banks by S&P on December 24, 1998. 
The results are presented in Table 4. On average, across all firms, bank 
downgrading constituted bad news, with an average CAR of –3.1 percent. More 
importantly, and in line with our findings on the stock price response to government 
actions, downgrading announcements appear to have been particularly harmful to highly 
leveraged companies, the coefficient on which is both statistically significant and of 
substantial magnitude. For example, in the pooled sample, firms with leverage two 
standard deviations above the mean experienced 7 percent lower CAR than the average! 
Also sensitive to downgrading are firms in low R&D industries and with low credit rating, 
although the magnitude of the coefficient implies a smaller effect than that of leverage. In   16
addition, there is evidence that large and profitable firms (with a high Tobin’s q) seem to 
suffer less from downgrading of their banks. The results in Table 4 suggest also that the 
impact of later downgrading announcements, in 1997 and 1998, during the peak of 
financial crisis period, far exceeded that of the early too downgrading events.
5   
Surprisingly, the dummy variable “main bank involved” (which takes the value 
one if a firm’s main bank was downgraded) suggests no special impact of downgrading 
on firms that use the downgraded bank as their main bank. This is because main bank ties 
do not matter, as the results of a regression specification with added measures of the 
strength of a firm’s ties to its main bank indicate. The coefficients on the ratio of bank 
loans to total assets or on the ratio of main bank loans to total assets are negative and 
statistically significant while the other coefficients remain unchanged (results shown in 
Appendix C). We conclude that bank-dependent firms suffer more from bank 
downgrading, even if their own main bank is not directly affected, because these events 
are interpreted as evidence of the weakness of the financial system as a whole.  
 
IV.3. Bank Mergers    
  The Japanese financial system experienced a wave of mergers and consolidation 
between 1999 and 2000 (see Appendix B). We focus here on the three largest and 
presumably most important mergers:  
(a)  The announcement of the formation of the Mizuho  Group (consisting of the 
former DKB, Fuji and IBJ banks) on August 20, 1999. 
                                                            
5It is also interesting to note that the results in Table 5 seem to correspond to the results reported by Brewer 
et al. (2002) for bank failures. They report that small, young, highly leveraged firms with low values of 
Tobin’s q were particularly adversely affected by the bank failure events they examine.    17
(b)  The announcement of the formation of the SMBC group (consisting of the former 
Sumitomo and Sakura banks) on October 14, 1999. 
(c)  The (first) announcement of the formation of the UFJ group (consisting of the 
former Sanwa, Tokai and Asahi banks)
6 on March 14, 2000. 
The results are presented in Table 5. Although the average effect of bank mergers 
was roughly zero bank mergers constituted good news for some firms. Firms with the 
most positive abnormal returns were not necessarily clients of the merging banks. 
Instead, there is a strong positive correlation between leverage and abnormal returns in 
the pooled sample, as well as in each of the mergers separately. According to the 
coefficient estimates in the pooled sample, highly leveraged companies (with leverage 
two standard deviations above the mean) experienced positive returns of about 2 
percent.
7  
Stock prices of firms in low R&D industries also responded positively (in 
relatively R&D intensive sectors the average CAR is about one percent lower than in 
low-tech industries), probably because banks tend to finance more traditional activities, 
and not so much research and development (Carlin and Mayer, 2002). This finding 
holds in two of the three mergers as well as in the pooled sample.  
Finally, mergers appear to have been viewed as good news for firms with a low 
credit rating, i.e. with restricted access to bond markets, and high dependence on bank 
finance, in line with the macroeconomic literature on “credit crunch” (see Kashyap et al., 
1993). The maximal possible change in credit rating (from no rating to a rating of A, or 
better) would raise the ten-day returns by about one percent. 
                                                            
6 Despite the initial announcement, Asahi Bank ended up not joining this group. 
7 Similar results are obtained when a measure of bank debt to total assets is included in the regression, see 
Appendix C.   18
Consistent with our results on downgrading announcements, and in line with the 
findings of Brewer et al. (2002) on three bank failures, there is not much difference 
between clients of the involved banks and other companies. One interpretation of this 
result is that mergers, much like bank downgrading or failure, are viewed as having an 
impact on the banking industry as a whole. Alternatively, mergers involving a firm’s 
main bank may have offsetting positive and negative effects: on the one hand they may 
improve the ability of banks to offer new loans. On the other hand, bank mergers may 
destroy relationships, or force an equity sale by the merged bank that can drive down the 
share prices of client firms.
8  
Finally, it is interesting to note that the UFJ merger (with Sanwa bank at its core) 
seemed to have generated the most positive abnormal returns of the three mergers. This is 
perhaps because some of the participating banks were perceived as particularly weak 
prior to the consolidation, and so the news about their survival through the proposed 
merger constituted more of a positive surprise.  
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
  Two main conclusions emerge from this study. First, the impact of Japan’s 
banking crisis has been far from homogenous: not all companies are equally affected by 
events in the banking sector. Second, companies, which we find to be especially sensitive 
to the malaise of the banking sector, are the ones that the macroeconomic literature has 
described as sensitive to “credit crunches.” Companies with limited access to bond 
                                                            
8 There is little evidence that the strength of bank-firm ties has any effect on the returns in this case. 
Measures of main bank debt to assets or of main bank shareholding are statistically insignificant when 
included in the regression (results shown in Appendix C). 
   19
finance (low rating), high levels of leverage (and bank debt) and, to a lesser extent, small 
and low profit companies, tend to be more susceptible than other companies to events in 
the banking sector. We also find that companies in R&D intensive industries are less 
affected by the banking crisis than companies in more traditional sectors. This is 
consistent with the view that bank debt is not a main source of finance to R&D. Our 
findings imply, then, that the Japanese banking crisis may include a (slow) “cleansing 
effect,” leading to the survival of better performing companies in high-R&D industries.   
   20
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Figure 1: Co-movement of Industry-specific Stock Price Indexes and Bank Stock 
Prices, 1995-2002 
 

















Note:  Based on the Tokyo Stock Exchange industry-specific ind
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Table 1: The Japanese Economy and Banking System, 1995-2001: Basic Indicators 
Fiscal Year  1992  1993  1994 1995 1996 1997  1998 1999  2000 2001
Inflation rate  1.4  0.5  -0.1  -0.5  -0.8  0.7  -0.5  -1.6  -1.9  -1.2 
Nominal GDP 
growth rate 
1.8  0.9  1.0  2.0  2.6  0.9  -1.3  0.3  -0.2  -2.5 
NIKKEI Index  
(end of March)  




3.3  2.5  2.8  3.0  3.5  3.2  2.5  3.1  4.2  N/A 
ROA  of major  
banks 
b 
0.20  0.12  0.03  - 0.54 - 0.16 - 2.01 - 3.71 0.16  N/A  N/A 
“Risky” loans 
c  12.8  13.6  12.5  21.9  16.4  22.0  20.3  19.8  19.3  27.6 
Losses due to 
non-performing 
loans 
1.6  3.9  5.2  11.1  6.2  10.8  10.4  5.4  4.3  7.7 
Allowance for 
loan losses 




0.4  2.5  5.3  10.8  14.5  18.0  22.3  25.9  28.5  31.9 
Total loans   0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  365.9 320.2 316.5  313.6 293.2
                     
 
(a) Average for all non-financial companies listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.   
(b) All of the rows below refer to average values for all city banks and the LTCB. 
(c) Measures of problem loans are all in trillion yen.   24
 
Table 2: Data Sources and Variable Definitions 










Total assets in 
(trillion yen)  
 
269,778  550,926 




Ratio of market 
value to book 
value 
1.09  1.27 






















0.49  N/A 
Bond rating  See text  On a range from 
4 (lowest, no 
rating) to 1(rated 
A or higher)  
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Table 3: The Effects of Government Actions to Address the Banking Crisis on 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Non-Financial Firms on Days (-5, +5) 
OLS regressions with event-specific intercepts. ***, ** and * denote coefficients significant at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent levels, respectively. The coefficient on assets is multiplied by 1,000,000. 
 
  Actions related to 
the Jusen Problem 



















































N  1603  3340  4307 
R
2  0.01  0.05  0.04 
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Table 4: The Effects of Bank Downgrading on Cumulative Abnormal Returns of 
Non-Financial Firms on Days (-5, +5) 
OLS regressions with event-specific intercepts in the pooled regression. ***, ** and * denote coefficients 
significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The coefficient on assets is multiplied by 
1,000,000.  
 






































































































N  4016  790  801  820  829  776 
R
2  0.22  0.02  0.01  0.17  0.28  0.12 
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Table 5: The Effects of Bank Mergers on Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Non-
Financial Firms on Days (-5, +5) 
OLS regressions with event-specific intercepts in the pooled regression. ***, ** and * denote coefficients 
significant at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The coefficient on assets is multiplied by 
1,000,000. 
 
  All Mergers  Mizuho  SMBC  UFJ 































































N  2606  862  862  882 
R
2  0.10  0.04  0.03  0.04 
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Appendix A: Bond Rating of Major Banks:  
The most conservative rating of S&P, Moody’s, JCRI and IBCA 









3/98 3/99 3/00 3/01 3/02









BBB- BB- BBB-  BBB-  BBB-
NCB Aozora  AA+  AA  A A A  BBB- BB+ BB+ BB- BB- BB BBB-
DKB Mizuho  AA  AA-  AA- A+ A+ A A  BBB
+ 
A A A  BBB
Sakura Sakura  AA+  AA+  AA- AA- AA- A- A- A- BBB BBB  A-  A-
Fuji Mizuho    AA  AA-  A+ A+ A+ A- A- BBB
+ 
A A+  A+  BBB
Mitsubishi Tokyo- 
Mitsubishi
AA+  AA  AA- AA- AA- A+ A+ A A- A- A-  BBB
+ 
Asahi Asahi  AA+  AA  A+ A A A A A  BBB BBB BB+ BB+







Sumitomo SMBC  AA+  AA  AA- A+ A+ A A A- BBB BBB BBB
+ 
BBB




BBB- BB+ BB+ BB+ BB+
Tokai Tokai AAA  AA+  AA- A A A A A  BBB- BBB- BBB  A 
Hokkaido- 
Takushoku 
- AA  AA  A A  .  BBB- BBB- BBB- . . . . 
Tokyo  -  AA+  AA+  AA+ AA+ .  AA+ AA+ . . . . .   29
 
Appendix B: The Consolidation of the Japanese Financial Industry: 
Press Announcements of Mergers and other Cooperation Agreements 
Source: Financial Supervision Agency  
 




Effective as of 
IBJ, Nomura Securities 
(Alliance) 
May 13, 1998    December 1998 / 
 January 1999 




  March 1999 




   




DK - Fuji Trust April 1, 1999 





Fuji Bank, Yasuda Trust  January 28, 
1999 
   
IBJ, IBJ Securities, Shin-






Universal, Taiheiyo, Towa, 
Dai-ichi Securities 
July 29, 1999  Tsubasa 
Securities  
April 2000 




Sakura, Sumitomo  October, 1999 SMBC  April 2001 
Sanwa, Tokai, Toyo Trust  July 4, 2000  UFJ holding 
 
April 2001 / 
January 2002 
TMB, Mitsubishi Trust with 
holding companies  
April 19, 2000 Mitsubishi Trust April 2001 
IBJ Securties, DK Securites, 
Fuji Securties 
May,25, 2000  Mizuho 
Securities 
October 2000 
Daiwa Sec. H.C, Sakura, 
Sumitomo, Sakura Sec. 
November 
28,2000 
Daiwa SMBC  April 2001 
DKB Trust and IBJ Trust  June 30, 2000  Mizuho Trust  October 2000 
Asahi, Daiwa     Risona  March ,2001 
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Appendix C: Additional Regression Specifications:  
The Effect of Bank Debt to Total Assets and Measures of Bank-Firm Ties.  
Dependent Variable: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Non-Financial Firms on 
Days (-5, +5) 
 
OLS regressions with event-specific intercepts. ***, ** and * denote coefficients significant at the 1, 5, and 
10 percent levels, respectively. The coefficient on assets is multiplied by 1,000,000. 
 
  Injections 







































































































  0.001 
(0.001) 
 
Bank loans to 
total assets 
    -0.014** 
(0.005) 
  0.010* 
(0.006) 
N  3340  4016  4016  2606  2606 
R
2  0.06  0.22  0.22  0.10  0.10 
  